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Change of Neighborhood in Nuisance Cases
Martin A. Levitin*
T HE LAW OF NUISANCE lies somewhere between the legal prin-
ciple that each person may use his property as he sees fit,
and the contradictory principle that he must so use it as not to
injure the property or rights of his neighbors. With the growth
of our nation, and its changing balance between rural and urban
populations, the established principles of tort law as applied to
nuisances evidence the "elastic adaptability" of the common
law.'
In urban areas, the validation of zoning has restricted uses
of private land 2 to keep the pig in the farmyard instead of the
backyard. And in rural and unzoned urban areas, judicial zoning
is liberalizing nuisance theories.3
The neighborhood conflicts between residential and agricul-
tural, industrial or commercial uses are many. So, also, are the
extraneous factors which have affected some court decisions in
nuisance cases. These have included economic effects, 4 aesthetic
considerations, 5 social values,6 and wars.7 In Gardner v. Inter-
national Shoe Co.7a we find the great heat and little light so
characteristic of nuisance cases.
Counsel for both plaintiffs and defendant have favored this
court with ably prepared briefs and arguments. Occasionally
*B.S., Case Institute of Technology; M.B.A., Harvard University; Executive
Assistant to the President, Byerlyte Corporation, Cleveland; Third-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Oleck, Nuisance in a Nutshell, 5 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 148 (1956).
2 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (Ohio, 1926);
Downham v. City Council of Alexandria, 58 F. 2d 784 (E. D. Va., 1932).
3 Beuscher and Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases,
1955 Wis. L. Rev. 440 (1955).
4 Commonwealth v. Miller, 139 Pa. 77, 21 A. 138 (1891); Smith v. Pittston
Co., 127 S. E. 2d 79 (Va., 1962).
5 V. V. C., The Modern Tendency Toward the Protection of the Aesthetic,
44 W. Va. L. Q. 58 (1937); Note, Urban Quietude by Law, 72 Solicitor's J.
& Weekly Repr. 671 (1928).
6 Restatement, Torts, Sec. 828; Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465,
78 N. E. 2d 752 (1947); Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552 (Fla., 1956).
7 Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416, 49 N. E. 2d 328 (1943);
Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 129 P. 2d 536 (Wash., 1942); Note,
Home Owners Rights Versus Industrial Expediency, 19 Ind. L. J. 167 (1944).
But contra, King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F. 2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945).
7a Ibid.
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they waxed a little literary and eloquent, for instance the
plaintiff says, "The rich man in his mansion on the hill, could
with the same intellectual honesty, say that he must aban-
don and destroy his home if he is not allowed to let his
sewage run down the hill into backyards of his poor neigh-
bors who live in the valley." The defendant, not to be out-
done says, "If plaintiffs are successful in this suit, not only
will the defendant's plant have to suspend operations, but so
will industrial plants all over the state. The hum of industry
and the whir of busy wheels so vital at this time to our
national defense and in repelling the unjust and treacherous
attacks which have been made upon us and our liberty and
institutions will cease, with consequences to this country too
terrible to contemplate." It is needless to say that this argu-
ment is interesting if not helpful. 7b
In this article, we shall explore the effects the changing of
the nature of a neighborhood has had on decisions in nuisance
cases.
Agricultural Uses
As residential subdivisions approach rural areas from vari-
ous directions, what are the likely effects of the changing neigh-
borhood pattern on the farmer and his operations?
In a recent Massachusetts case it was held that the opera-
tion of a piggery on a 25 acre tract had become a nuisance by
reason of change in environs from farm to residential district,
and further operation of the piggery was enjoined.8 Although
this case did not establish a precedent for this point of view, 9
contrast this holding with that of the Kansas courts, where one
moving into an agricultural area was held bound to accept agri-
cultural pursuits historically carried on in the area.'0 Or further,
the case where an action to abate operation of a slaughter house
originally built in a comparatively uninhabited area failed, al-
though residences had since been erected in its vicinity."
Other sharp contrasts appear between jurisdictions in their
attitudes toward rural pursuits, where these pursuits are in con-
flict with rights of habitation in areas characterized by mixed
rural and urban land uses. In a small Wisconsin town a stock-
7b Id. at 335.
8 Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N. E. 2d 142 (Mass., 1962).
9 Commonwealth v. Perry, 139 Mass. 198, 29 N. E. 656 (1885).
10 Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P. 2d 539 (1958).
11 Ballantine v. Webb, 84 Mich. 38, 47 N. W. 485, Annot., 13 L. R. A. 32
(1890).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss2/18
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
yard nuisance near the railroad station was not abated despite
suit by aggrieved local residents, since no other reasonably con-
venient and practicable location for the stockyards could be
found.1 2 A Texas community was subjected to the annoyances
of a cotton gin operation on similar reasoning."1 In Missouri a
city ordinance prohibiting the keeping of hogs within city limits
from April 1st to October 15th of each year was struck down as
wholly arbitrary.1 4 Cattle and hog raising were protected from
complaining residents in Nebraska and Kentucky.' 5 Noisy ducks
received an umbrella of protection in rural Ohio.16
Courts of other jurisdictions have not been so tolerant of
agrarian nuisances where residential neighbors have been offend-
ed. Cattle and hog pens in Indiana were considered to be incom-
patible with hotel and boarding houses in the neighborhood, and
required abatement. 17 Slaughter houses historically have been
held to be nuisances even when originally built in remote places,
where nearby home building has taken place.' s Even passersby
on the highway have been protected from the olfactory discom-
forts of slaughter houses.19
California has been hard on farm nuisances, to the benefit
of adjoining residents. 20 In Michigan, where a city maintained a
piggery to dispose of garbage, neighbors eliminated the nuisance
by means of an injunction.2 1 Relatively early, Massachusetts
courts had established their position by granting to municipalities
the right to enjoin the keeping of hogs within city limits. 22
Farm operations can continue to expect rough treatment
from the courts as cities bulge and protrude into previously agri-
12 Dolan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Rwy. Co., 118 Wis. 362, 95 N. W. 385 (1903).
Is Gose v. Coryell, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 126 S. W. 1164 (1910).
14 Note, 34 Law Notes 113 (1930); Kays v. City of Versailles, 22 S. W. 2d
182 (Mo. App., 1929).
15 Vana v. Grain Belt Supply Co., 143 Neb. 118, 10 N. W. 2d 474 (1943);
Hall v. Budde, 293 Ky. 436, 169 S. W. 2d 33 (1943).
10 DeAlbert v. Novak, 78 Ohio App. 80, 69 N. E. 2d 73 (1946).
17 Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Simon, 40 Ind. 278 (1872).
18 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872).
19 State v. Woodbury, 67 Vt. 602, 32 A. 495 (1895).
20 McIntosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770, 230 P. 203 (1924); Cook v.
Hatcher, 121 Cal. App. 398, 9 P. 2d 231 (1932).
21 Note, 31 Law Notes 152 (1927); Trowbridge v. Lansing, 237 Mich. 402, 212N. W. 73 (1927).
22 Note, Right to Enjoin Keeping of Swine Within Limits of Municipality,
32 Law Notes 32 (1928); Lexington v. Miskell, 260 Mass. 544, 157 N. E. 598
(1928).
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cultural areas. There will, however, be some consolation for the
farmers in increased land values.
Industrial Uses
What effects may changing community characteristics have
on the operations of an industrial plant in a remote area?
Earliest writings on the law of nuisance reflected antagonis-
tic opinions.
23
As the city extends such nuisances should be removed to
the vacant grounds beyond the immediate neighborhood of
the residence of the citizens. This public policy, as well as
the health and comfort of the population of the city, de-
mand. 24
Factories established in open country were forced to move in
deference to the rights of approaching homes.25 Special care in
the operation of the nuisance-creating plant was no defense; it
was held not to be error for a Maryland court to refuse to in-
struct a jury that persons must submit to the reasonable conse-
quences of the operation of an expensive factory producing goods
useful to the public.26
A vested interest cannot, because of conditions once obtain-
ing, be asserted against the proper exercise of police power
-to so hold would preclude development.
21
Those times were not, however, without their voices in the
protection of valuable industry. In Pennsylvania an oil refinery
successfully defended against its neighbors' complaints, on
grounds of the nature and importance of the business to the
growth and prosperity of the community as well as of the great
23 Joyce, Law of Nuisances (2d ed., 1906); Wood, The Law of Nuisances
(1893).
24 Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230 (1873).
25 Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. Ed. 1036
(Ili., 1878); Yaffe v. Ft. Smith, 178 Ark. 406, 10 S. W. 2d 886, Annot., 61
A. L. R. 1138 (1928); Green v. Gilbert, 60 N. H. 144 (1880); City of Baltimore
v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352, 39 A. 1081, Annot., 40 L. R. A. 494, 67 Am.
St. Rep. 344 (1898); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567
(1876); People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46 N. W. 735,
Annot., 9 L. R. A. 722 (1890); Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md.
276, 20 A. 900, Annot., 9 L. R. A. 737, 25 Am. St. Rep. 595 (1890); North
American Cement Corp. v. Price, 164 Md. 234, 164 A. 545 (1933).
26 Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Spangler, 86 Md. 562, 39 A. 270, 63 Am. St.
Rep. 533 (1898).
27 Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 35 S. Ct. 678 (Mo.,
1915).
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capital investment involved.28 An Alabama court, although abat-
ing a nuisance created by an ice cream plant, recognized that
Discomforts necessarily incident to businesses essential to
existence and progress of people must be endured without
legal recourse.29
Other cases show the influences of the industrial giant and
sheer expediency. In Utah, oil refinery odors, causing discomfort
to nearby homeowners without injuring life or health, could not
be abated.30 In Washington residents could not protect them-
selves against smoke, gases, and dust from local industrial activ-
ity.81 In Illinois the umbrella of protection was raised over a
tannery when it was held to be against public policy to interfere
with normal industrial activity.
3 2
Apt summary of the widely accepted liberal view33 is found
in a case denying abatement of a nuisance created by 75 coke
ovens:
All that can be required of men who engage in lawful busi-
ness is that they shall regard the fitness of locality. In the
residence sections of a city, business of no kind is desirable
or welcome. On the other hand, one who becomes a resi-
dent of a trading or manufacturing neighborhood, or who
remains while in the march of events a residential district
gradually becomes a trading or manufacturing neighborhood,
should be held bound to submit to the ordinary annoyances,
discomforts, and injuries which are fairly incidental to the
reasonable and general conduct of such business in his
chosen neighborhood. The true rule would be that any dis-
comfort or injury beyond this would be actionable.3 4
28 Commonwealth v. Miller, supra n. 4.
29 Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Blackwell, 217 Ala. 330, 116 So. 348, Annot., 58
A. L. R. 1223 (1928). See also, Wojnar v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 348 Pa.
595, 36 A. 2d 321 (1944); Maloney v. Pounds, 361 Pa. 498, 64 A. 2d 802 (1949).
30 Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269 (1927).
81 Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, supra n. 7.
32 Comment, Home Owners Rights Versus Industrial Expediency, 19 Ind.
L. J. 167 (1944); Gardner v. Int. Shoe Co., supra n. 7.
33 Hannum v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 31 A. 2d 99 (1943); Patterson v. Peabody
Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N. E. 2d 48 (1954); Lee v. Florida Public
Utilities Co., 145 So. 2d 299 (Fla., 1962).
84 Soukoup v. Republic Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 66 N. E. 2d 334, 340(1946) quoting Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51, 57, 67 N. E. 89, 91 (1903).
See also, Burke v. Hollinger, 296 Pa. 510, 146 A. 115 (1929); City of Mil-
waukee v. Milbrew, Inc., 240 Wis. 527, 3 N. W. 2d 386 (1942); Chicago v.
Reuter Bros. Iron Works, 398 Ill. 202, 75 N. E. 2d 355, Annot., 173 A. L. R.
266 (1947).
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There still remain some jurisdictions that deal harshly with
industrial nuisances. Arkansas courts have held that it is the
nature and character of the locality at the time of the annoyance
that governs, and that private rights must yield to public rights
in the developing community, notwithstanding a city operating
license. 35 In a Louisiana case a United States District Court
stated that the right of habitation is superior to the rights of
industry or trade, and that as the population approaches a nui-
sance the latter must be abated immediately.36 Virginia courts
have also held that importance to the wealth and prosperity of
a community does not give industry rights superior to those of
nearby residents.
3 7
The element preference of time-ownership has resulted in
three theories.38 The extreme views are first, that a nuisance in
existence for many years obtains prescriptive rights, and that one
knowing of the nuisance and moving nearby assumes the risk39;
or second, that although one knows of the nuisance and moves
in, damages can be recovered. 40 A third and middle view holds
that the fact that one moves to a nuisance is an important con-
sideration in determining the case and tends to moderate the
remedy available to the plaintiff to abate the nuisance.
41
Business & Commercial Uses
A homeowner brings suit to enjoin operation of an existing
but discomforting business in a residential area. What is the
probable result? Similarly, a homeowner in an established resi-
dential neighborhood receives notice of the intention of a busi-
ness to locate in his vicinity. What rights does he have against
the intruder?
35 Ft. Smith v. Western Hide Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S. W. 724 (1922).
36 Alford v. Illinois Central Rwy. Co., 86 F. Supp. 424 (W. D. La., 1954).
37 Smith v. Pittston Co., supra n. 4.
38 Russell, Zoning Laws in Reference to Prior Established Businesses,
1 Baylor L. Rev. 87 (1948); Garmon, Time of Creation of Nuisance-Those
Privileged, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 382 (1952).
39 Austin v. Converse, 219 Pa. 3, 67 A. 921 (1907); Strieber v. Ward, 196
S. W. 720 (Tex. Civ. App., 1917); aford v. Nickel, 1 S. W. 2d 751 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1928); McClung v. Louisville & N. Rwy. Co., 255 Ala. 302, 51 S. 2d 371
(1951).
40 Alford v. Illinois Central Rwy. Co., supra note 36; Galveston, H. & S. A.
Rwy. Co. v. Miller, 93 S. W. 177 (Tex. Civ. App., 1907); Bickley v. Morgan
Utilities Co., 173 Ark. 1038, 294 S. W. 38 (1927).
41 Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola, 251 Iowa 222, 100 N. W. 2d 189 (1959);
Hall v. Budde, supra n. 15; Oliver v. Forney Cotton Oil and Ginning Co.,
226 S. W. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921).
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In the leading case of Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 42 the Cali-
fornia courts sustained an ordinance prohibiting operation of a
brickyard in a residential area annexed to the city. The court
gave little solace for the near million dollar loss, in the following
rationale:
. . . to permit such an interest vested because of conditions
once obtaining would preclude development and fix a city
forever in its primitive conditions. There must be progress,
and if in its march private interests are in the way, they
must yield to the good of the community.4 3
Similar fates have befallen junk yards,44 used car lots,4 5 auto-
mobile wrecking yards,46 and even a city dump.47 In the case of
a riding academy forced to abandon its former location in a resi-
dential neighborhood, the court wasted little sympathy on this
business, holding it to be non-essential and not dependent upon
a fixed location.48 With aplomb, Justice Musmanno disposed of
the problems created by a badly-operated drive-in theater 49
The person who lives in the middle of a city cannot, of
course, ask to be immunized from the effects of the tur-
bulence, traffic and noises which are inevitably part of urban
life, but the person who moves into a rural area to escape
such turbulence, traffic and noises has the right to ask the
law to bar turbulence, traffic and noises from pursuing him.
50
Where residential neighborhoods have experienced a decline,
the general rule has been to the contrary, as in the early case of
Doellner v. Tynan51 :
Where a street in a city ceases to be used or occupied as a
place of residence and is changed into a place of business,
no one or two persons, who may desire to continue to reside
therein can restrain the carrying on of a lawful and useful
42 239 U. S. 394 (Cal., 1915), affg. Ex Parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 132 P.
584 (1913).
43 Id., at 410.
44 Freed, Note, 5 Notre Dame Law. 43 (1929); Weishahn v. Kemper, 32 Ohio
App. 313, 167 N. E. 468 (1928).
45 Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S. E. 2d 835 (1956).
46 Bowlin v. George, 123 S. E. 2d 528 (S. C., 1962).
47 Mile Road Corp. v. City of Boston, 187 N. E. 2d 826 (Mass., 1963).
48 Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N. W. 2d 1, Annot., 174 A. L. R.
746 (1947).
49 Guarina v. Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 180 A. 2d 557 (1962).
50 Id., at 561.
51 38 How. Prac. 176 (N. Y., 1869).
May, 1964
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trade in such street, because they are subjected to an-
noyance or even loss thereby. Better that they should go
elsewhere than the public be inconvenienced by arresting
a useful and necessary business. .... 52
The newcomer business also drove out the old residents in a
concurring Michigan case of the same period.53 Once the de-
cline begins, the presumption seems to favor the commercial
growth. Funeral homes often have successfully put their feet in
the doors of declining residential neighborhoods.54
Even without neighborhood decline, it is often difficult for
residents to keep commercialization out. An automobile repair
garage moved in where the court felt that the public benefit
preponderated over the private inconvenience, and injunctive re-
lief against the anticipated nuisance was denied.55 A recent
phenomenon, the swim club, also has avoided categorization as
a nuisance, with the court recognizing and discounting, as a con-
trolling factor, the diminished values of plaintiff's property5":
It is not enough that acts complained of diminish the value
of plaintiff's property to warrant enjoining them as nui-
sance7
An even more flagrant invasion was held to be beyond judi-
cial abatement, where the construction of an industrial loading
dock to move stone became an accomplished fact to the summer
cottage owners on Lake Huron.58 The court's reasoning was
based upon the value of the new installation as compared with
that of the existing homes:
Such a decree would amount to outright destruction and
loss of valuable property constituting an even greater wrong
than that which the company has perpetrated. 59
52 Id., at 178.
53 Gilbert v. Showerman, 2 Mich. N. P. 158 (1871).
54 Lynch, Restricting Undertaking Establishments, 14 Georgetown L. J. 352(1926); Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 P. 976 (1922);
Meldahl v. Holberg, 55 N. D. 523, 214 N. W. 802 (1927); Comment, 26 Va. L.
Rev. 392 (1940); Dawson v. Laubensweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 42 N. W. 2d 726
(1950).
55 Nevis v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925). But contra, Ballstadt
v. Pagel, 202 Wis. 484, 232 N. W. 862 (1930).
56 Marco v. Swinnerton, 22 Conn. Sup. 335, 171 A. 2d 418 (1960).
57 Id., at 418.
58 Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 399, 105 N. W. 2d 143 (1960).
59 Id., at 153.
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Zoning and Nuisance
The interrelation of zoning and nuisance have been well ex-
plored since the leading case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.60
established zoning as an important force in the control of urban
land uses.6 1 Zoning systems involve the regulation of land uses
based upon the police power of the state, whether the uses are
nuisances or not. The intent is to supply a planned scheme of
development which will benefit the entire community. Consider-
ation is given to the character of the district, its suitability for
particular uses, conservation of property values, lessening of
traffic congestion, public safety, and aesthetics. These factors
are identical to those usually considered in nuisance cases.
Zoning may be tending to liberalize nuisance law, according
to the results of an analysis of court decisions involving nuisance
in an unzoned area.62 Zoning systems tend to perpetuate the
status quo in residential, industrial and commercial districts,
and to prevent the changing of neighborhoods. They cannot,
however, be made to serve as a protection, authorization or
licensing authority for the perpetuation of nuisances.6 3
Nor, on the other hand, can nonconforming uses which were
not actual nuisances be removed without compensation.6 4 Zoning
ordinances also cannot be used by municipalities to arbitrarily
deal with existing property rights.6 5 Withholding of a building
permit during pendency of a zoning ordinance, 66 interim zoning
of a district of changing character pending passage of legisla-
60 Supra, n. 2.
61 Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 Columbia L. Rev. 457 (1941);
Kurtz, Effect of Land Use Legislation on the Common Law of Nuisance in
Urban Areas, 36 Dicta 414 (1959); Comment, Zoning and the Law of
Nuisance, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 749 (1961).
62 Beuscher and Morrison, op. cit. supra n. 3.
63 E. H. G., Nuisance-Zoning Laws, 1 So. Cal. L. Rev. 97 (1927); Williams
v. Blue Bird Laundry, 54 Cal. App. Dec. 126 (1927); Jones v. Kelley Trust
Co., 179 Ark. 857, 18 S. W. 2d 356 (1929); Note, Zoning-Legislative Au-
thorization as a Defense to an Action for Nuisance, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 482
(1956); Fuchs v. Curran Carb. & Eng. Co., 279 S. W. 2d 211 (Mo., 1956);
Reid v. Brodsky, 397 Pa. 463, 156 A. 2d 334 (1959).
64 Beuscher & Morrison, op. cit. supra n. 3.
65 Russell, op. cit. supra, n. 38; City of Chicago v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works,
75 N. E. 2d 335 (Ill., 1948); Comment, Zoning Law, Injunction to Restrain
Proposed Operation, 9 Fordham L. Rev. 437 (1940); Sweet v. Campbell, 282
N. Y. 146, 25 N. E. 2d 963 (1940).
66 State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N. E.
2d 777 (1941).
May, 1964
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tion,67 and an ordinance providing that undesirable business
could be ordered terminated after a reasonable period,68 all have
been struck down in Ohio as deprivations of property without
due process of law.
Zoning has attempted to prevent future conflicts. Neverthe-
less, the dynamic growth of metropolitan populations, and the
changes brought about through urban renewal and changing
neighborhoods, will continue to provide the courts with nuisance
cases. Resolution of these cases will continue to be made by the
application of elastic rules applied to meet changing needs cre-
ated by the population explosion, scientific advances, social, and
other changes. 69
67 Henn v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 144 N. E. 2d 917 (Ohio, 1957). See
also Annot. 136 A. L. R. 840 (1942); 42 A. L. R. 2d 1140 (1955); and 58 Am.
Jur. 1021 (1948).
68 City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N. E. 2d 697 (1953).
69 An imaginative, fictional introduction into these potential problems may
be found in Frederik Pohl and C. M. Kornbluth, The Space Merchants(New York: Ballantine Books, 1953).
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